This area of investigation was directed toward addressing the impact of operations on the Safaniya Utility Units’ Asset Management Program. Table 3-16 lists the issues addressed and the resultant findings.


System Observation
Well Formation Water Injection • G-30A/B/C formation water injection pumps control valves LCV-630A/B/C can’t be controlled from control room. Flow adjustments are carried out manually via field operators. Control valve LCV-1071 was removed and discharge line was bypassed. The corrosion is eating the close clearance parts causing high recirculation and overloading the motor.
• G-1412A/B/C/D formation water injection pump control valves LCV-1560A/B not functioning properly. The installed bypass line is presently used for control. Large pressure drop across the valves (delta P ~900psi observed on the Digital Control System (DCS) screen) at
100% level. Bypass line was installed to relieve pump discharge overload. It was designed for full capacity operation which will not be achieved for 5+ years.
• Pumps G26-G-1412A/B/C/D and G26-G-1413A/B/C/D pumps are not usable because of the seal flush problems.
• Injection water pressure controlled below 1200psi for two FBE lined pipes that carry injection water to wells. Higher pressure causes leaks in pipes.
• One of the Seal Flush pump G-255C/D runs at minimum capacity. Seal Flush water supplies seal water to the formation water injection pumps. The motor will be stripped if the pump runs at higher capacity. The other pump is kept as emergency standby (not reliable).
• Skimmed oil from new CPI oil/water separators D-
1407A/B/C and D-1409A/B/C was fed to D-1408
Recovered Oil drum. Currently, pumps G-1411A/B transfer oil from D-1408 cannot handle the capacity of the separators; therefore, the separators are running at
level around 37-45%. Operator noted the separators
can’t run at full capacity. (This is under consideration by the project management team who was responsible for the construction).
• There is monitoring instrumentation not indicated on DCS for the existing CPI unit D-212A/B/C and D-343A/B/C. Individual control valves on the inlet and outlet of each CPI 1407, FCV at the header of CPI 343A/B and PCV at the inlet of CPI 212A/B are installed and monitored. Check of the P&IDs indicates that instrumentation is installed on each vessel. However, signals/indications from these instrument are not configured correctly.
Washwater Unit • Relief valves are inspected per schedule. However, in- place testing of the boiler relief valves was last performed in 2008-2009 per available records. Per inspectors and maintenance shop supervisor, in-place testing is performed when requested by the supervising operator.
• Temporary hoses delivering treatment chemicals to BFW drums for temporary testing of the BFW are lying on the ground that is a safety hazard. Operation with the hoses is necessary to continue operation with out tube leaks; project to fix underway.
MED Unit The MED unit is designed to delivered 450gpm (Net product of 400gpm) per evaporator. Currently, the best evaporator can deliver 330gpm max and the lowest capacity of 220gpm was observed on one of the evaporator. Flow controlled valve FCV-1251 was not working properly.
Sea Water Supply and Brine Water Pump-out Lines CP system is provided to protect these under-ground lines as evident from the CP records. Lines in current conditions indicate the CP system functioning as intend, compared to lines’ useful life of 50 years in service
Are procedures or standards involved in defining the safe operating envelope? Integrity Operating Window (IOW) was not developed for the unit. Operating limits were defined per the unit Operations Instruction Manuals (OIM) instrumentation set points.
Are the implications of operating outside of the safe operating envelope clearly understood? No, they are not understood from the perspective of the negative affect the operating outside the operating or design limits can have on reducing the remaining useful life of equipment. This is to be addressed though the development of Integrity Operating Windows (IOWs)
How are key operational data recorded and compared against safe limits? While operational data is recorded though the DCS, and could be documented in the system’s data historian, the lack of an established integrity Operating Window (IOW)1 program keeps them from being compared against safe limits.
How are excursions outside of the safe operating envelope communicated to others? To whom the communicated? While excursion outside of limits are conveyed to operations management, there was no evidence that excursions were conveyed to the inspection or maintenance organizations for further analysis.
Does the facility have a full set of operating procedures? Do these make reference to safe operating limits? Yes
Is there a procedure for the management of shift handovers? Information not available.
What approach is used to determine isolation procedures? Isolation procedures are a part of the work order when required.
What procedure is used for identification and access to locked valves? Not determined.
What procedures are used for equipment mothballing or long-term General mothball procedure is available from Aramco
Manual SAER-2365.
what corrossion control systems are used (e.g., corrosion inhibitors, cathodic protection, coatings etc.)? Cathodic protection and coatings are the primary means of corrosion control for static equipment and piping. Chemical treatment is used in the boilers and in the seal water system, primarily for pH control.
Modifications to process, feed/product material, equipment being verified? Managed through the Management of Change (MOC)
Work instructions and control instructions are simple and clear, availability and yes
Is training of operator defined and done? yes
Are drawings (PFD, P&ID, ISO, Equipment data sheets, and standards) in latest version? Plant policy and the Memorandum of change policy require the drawings be updated to “as built” condition as a part of the closeout of the MOC process, A review of MOCs (see Section 2.12 below) did not provide objective evidence that this was accomplished in all cases.

The key findings from the Operations Practices area are summarized as follows:
• The operations issues within Well Formation Water Injection, Washwater Unit, MED Unit, and Sea Water Supply system and Brine Water Pump-out Lines are understood in detail by the Utility Units’ staff and the solutions proposed to deal with issues are appropriate.

• Safe operating parameters and limits have been defined per the unit OIM’s instrumentation set points. Intertek AIM will provide an IOW limit summary for the Utility Units.


Other Info

Document Category Engineering
Document Target Users testing

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